Scandal! How the Ford-Firestone disaster exploded

The first iteration was launched in 1990 with seemingly a great deal going for it: a rugged go-anywhere style, spacious interior, decent V6 power, optional four-wheel drive and big-boot practicality among its attributes. It quickly appealed to families, who appreciated its added versatility compared with their outgoing sedans. Off-road enthusiasts welcomed its all-terrain capability. And back on the black stuff, it was more comfortable than the hardcore traditional 4x4s. The Explorer quickly became the star of the fledgling American SUV market.

Yet underneath, as with so many early American SUVs, it was mechanically crude. To save on cost, it used a 1970s truck platform that also underpinned the Ranger pick-up and the infamous Bronco II SUV (nicknamed ‘the bucking Bronco’) that had already stirred up a hornet’s nest of lawsuits involving rollovers. Time magazine would later report that Ford spent $2.4 billion in damages related to the Bronco II.

The platform also used ‘twin beam’ swing axle front suspension, a crude yet tough form of independent suspension that dated back to 1965 and which supposedly offered better ride quality than the solid beam axles used by some rivals. The downside was that vertical movement induced camber changes in the suspension, upsetting stability. It was not dissimilar to the problem the same basic suspension design had helped create at the rear of the ‘unsafe at any speed’ Chevrolet Corvair in the 1960s. Add the narrow truck chassis and the car’s inherent top heaviness, and trouble could be seen brewing. Or at least it ought to have been.

At the same time, the fateful decision was taken to use Firestone 15-inch P235 tyres – marketed as the ATX, ATX II and Wilderness AT. Firestone had recently been acquired by the Japanese tyre giant Bridgestone but the time-honoured Ford-Firestone partnership remained firmly intact – at least for now.

When prototype testing by Ford revealed alarming stability problems for the new Explorer, four options were proposed: widening the chassis, lowering the engine, reducing recommended tyre pressures or stiffening the springs. Ford chose the last two, by far the cheapest of the available options. The lower pressures – 26psi not Firestone’s recommended 30 – helped road holding but it also meant higher temperatures, contributing to tyre degradation. It would be one of Firestone’s key defences when Ford first pointed the finger of blame.

Once Explorer sales began, the profits accrued (it would become Ford’s most profitable model line). But so did the crashes.

A redesign of the twin beam front suspension in 1995 for the facelifted second-generation Explorer should have helped stability, but if it did it wasn’t by much or, indeed, nearly enough. The vehicle was still too narrow and top heavy.

Into our tale now enters new Ford CEO and president Jac Nasser who had recently finished a successful stint as boss of Ford of Europe. There, he oversaw the launch of the Focus, among other game-changing cars. Highly popular with (most) staff and the media, Jac was a ‘car guy’ determined to shake up Ford.

He took the top Ford job in early 1999, promoted the gifted Richard Parry-Jones to global product guru to boost dynamic quality and hired Wolfgang Reitzle from BMW to head up the new Premier Automotive Group of luxury brands. This now consisted of Land Rover, Volvo (both bought under Nasser’s watch) plus Jaguar, Aston Martin and Lincoln.

Nasser brought in scores of newcomers to shake up traditional Ford thinking. He was far-sighted in building brands, in e-commerce, in employee engagement, promoting diversity, in social conscience, on stressing ‘customer first’ and in diversifying Ford into automotive services, on top of its traditional car manufacturing. He could be ruthless with underperforming managers and factories, firing the former and shuttering the latter (Dagenham car production was one casualty). In his first year in charge (1999), Ford recorded a profit of $7.2 billion, then the largest in car industry history.

By the time Nasser was ensconced in the CEO’s top floor office in Ford HQ in Dearborn, Michigan, the scandal was coming to a head. Numerous lawsuits were launched against Ford and Firestone, some dating back to 1992, the majority after 1996. Some came from abroad, including Venezuela. Most accidents happened in the hot weather states of Arizona, California, Florida and Texas: heat exacerbated the tyre degradation, which lead to the tread separation that precipitated the accidents. The US National Highway Traffic Safety Administration began formally to investigate in early 2000. So did US Congress. The high-profile Ford-Firestone corporate blame game began.

Nasser bore no responsibility for the Explorer’s poor dynamics. Ironically, he was determined to make Ford world beaters in this area, and indeed made significant progress before being sacked. Yet, when the muck started to fly, Nasser insisted on standing as the Ford figurehead, culminating in a prime-time TV appearance.

In August 2000, Firestone recalled 6.5 million tyres – most made at its Decatur plant in Illinois – at a cost of $750 million. Yet it still pinned the blame on the Explorer, insisting that the same tyre on other SUVs held up fine. Disputing this, Ford pointed out that Explorers fitted with Goodyear rubber had far fewer problems. This increasingly public feud between two US auto industry giants was, of course, music to the ears of the lawyers, keen to pitch one giant corporation against the other.

Believing the Firestone recall to be insufficient, Nasser ordered the voluntary recall of 13 million Firestone tyres fitted to Ford trucks and SUVs, replacing them with rival brands. He did so, he later told lawmakers at a committee meeting on Capitol Hill, ‘in the interests of customers, safety and peace of mind’. It cost Ford $3 billion. Firestone simultaneously cancelled all future contracts with Ford: the century-old partnership was dead.

Ford chairman William Clay Ford Junior, son of a Ford and of a Firestone – and Nasser’s boss – spoke of his personal anguish. The US head of Firestone was sacked, and soon after the global head of Bridgestone – Firestone’s owner – quit. Firestone’s Decatur plant, ground zero for the scandal, closed at the end of 2001, and all 1800 employees were laid off. Firestone’s US sales dropped 40 per cent. Many of its US activities would be rebranded as Bridgestone. In 2001, Bridgestone’s global profits dived 80 per cent.

In 2001, Ford lost $5.5 billion, much of it due to the Firestone recall. In October 2001 Ford sacked Nasser and made himself CEO. He reversed many Nasser initiatives, including his predecessor’s fondness for premium brands. Jaguar, Land Rover, Aston Martin and Volvo were all sold off.

In all, more than 200 people died and an estimated 700 injured in crashes involving early Explorers and their Firestone tyres.

The dynamically dodgy Explorer was totally redesigned for 2002, including a wider track, four-wheel independent suspension and electronic stability control. Unlike the Firestone brand, the Explorer name quickly recovered. It would go on to be the best-selling SUV of all time in America: almost nine million have been sold to date. It is now heavily promoted in Europe, in the form of a new electric SUV. Like Mustang, it’s become a Ford premium sub-brand.

America’s love affair with the SUV would continue unabated, despite the scandal surrounding its best-selling nameplate, and widespread publicity that SUVs were significantly more likely to roll over than conventional cars. Yet customers kept buying. They still do.